The Chicken-Egg Problem of Disruptive Innovation
Why market analysis fails for breakthrough technologies
The Standard Argument
When an inventor presents a new technology, they almost always hear the same thing:
"That's a small niche. The market is limited. There are already established providers."
The logic behind this seems irrefutable: If a technology has existed for decades and the market is still small, then it will probably stay small. This isn't malicious — it's the language of market analysis, due diligence, responsible investment decisions.
But this logic has a fundamental flaw: It's a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Vicious Cycle
Let's take a concrete example from mechanical engineering: Polygon shaft-hub connections. In every textbook on machine elements, the same sentence has appeared for decades:
"Polygon connections are technically superior but too expensive to manufacture."
Engineering students learn this. So they design with keyways and spline profiles — because that's "economical." It says so in the textbook.
But the premise is wrong. Since 1985, a manufacturing process has existed that produces polygon profiles cheaper than conventional methods — because no additional manufacturing steps are required. The polygon is created during turning in a single operation.
But nobody knows this. Because nobody teaches it. Because nobody applies it. Because nobody knows about it.
This is the vicious cycle:
No demand → No machines → No experience →
No teaching → No designers who specify it → No demand
The Paradox of Evidence
When an inventor tries to break this cycle, they face a paradox:
"Show me evidence that the market exists."
But the market doesn't exist yet — precisely because no one has broken through the cycle yet. The evidence that is demanded would only exist if someone had already done what the inventor is trying to do.
The market measures what exists. It doesn't measure what could be. And so the "niche" stays small — not because the technology is limited, but because the system can't imagine that the textbooks are wrong.
The Wrong Question
When investors or funding agencies ask for "market data," they typically ask this question:
"How big is the current market for this technology?"
That's the wrong question. The right question is:
"How many products are being made today with an inferior technology, even though a better and cheaper alternative exists?"
For shaft-hub connections, the answer is: Millions. In every gearbox, every electric motor, every machine tool, every industrial robot, every wind turbine, every vehicle transmission.
The market is gigantic. It's just invisible, because nobody looks at it from this angle.
The Automobile Analogy
Imagine someone had asked in 1900:
"If horse carriages meet transportation needs — why do we need automobiles?"
The answer isn't: "Because carriages don't work."
The answer is: "Because automobiles enable something that was unthinkable with carriages."
Disruptive technologies don't simply replace existing solutions. They open up possibilities that didn't exist before. The automobile didn't just replace the carriage — it enabled commuter traffic, goods logistics, suburbs, and an entirely new way of life.
The "market" for automobiles in 1900 was tiny: a few wealthy enthusiasts. Market analysis would have said: "Small niche, established providers (carriage builders), no growth potential."
Administrators and Entrepreneurs
The argument "Prove to me that the market exists before we invest" reveals a fundamental attitude:
It's the logic of the administrator, not the entrepreneur.
The administrator asks
"What is?"
The entrepreneur asks
"What could be?"
Germany has many administrators and few entrepreneurs. The funding landscape is optimized for risk minimization, not opportunity maximization. Every application demands "market analyses" and "profitability forecasts" — documents that, for genuine breakthrough technologies, cannot possibly be meaningful.
Because the market for a disruptive technology doesn't yet exist in the form it will take. The smartphone market in 2005 looked like "a niche for businesspeople with Blackberrys." The e-commerce market in 1995 looked like "a toy for tech enthusiasts."
Who Breaks the Cycle?
The chicken-egg cycle will be broken. Someone will look at the millions of shaft-hub connections being made every year with expensive, slow, inferior technology, and say: "This can be done better."
The question isn't whether the market will develop.
The question is: Who will develop it?
Will it be a German company that recognizes the opportunity? Or will it be someone in China who isn't burdened by decades of "That's how we've always done it" — and who doesn't ask for market data to prove the market before creating it?
Conclusion
The chicken-egg problem isn't a technical problem. It's a problem of lack of imagination.
The technology exists. It works. It's cheaper and better. But the system can't imagine that the textbooks are wrong.
So the niche stays small. And everyone nods and says: "See? We were right. The market is limited."
But they weren't right. They just stopped asking.
"The niche is small because nobody has made it big yet."
This essay is part of the series "Germany's Innovation Desert"
The material will flow into the book "Celestial Mechanics in the Machine Tool."